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In April, 1938, Professor Felix Frankfurter delivered three public lectures
which were published later in that year, and are now republished, under the
title, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court. The lectures dealt not, as the
title might have suggested, with the whole body of Justice Holmes' work as
a member of the Supreme Court, but specifically with the opinions, attitudes
and beliefs of Justice Holmes in constitutional cases-with Holmes as a con-
stitutional judge, if that phrase may be used to designate a judge's involve-
ment in a class of litigation rather than the source and dignity of his office. As
a constitutional judge, the figure of Justice Holmes had probably, around
1938, achieved its greatest stature. In 1932, when the Justice retired, it was
indeed a major figure not only of its time but of the history of the Court,
but the fact remained that on what Professor Frankfurter called the "ante-
cedent issue" "underlying all the myriad forms" of constitutional litigation-
the issue of the role of the judge in constitutional cases-Justice Holmes had
long and consistently been in a minority. By 1938, the balance appeared to
have shifted, and the figure of Holmes appeared magnified by a victory no less
significant because delayed and posthumous. -Professor Frankfurter could
therefore cap praise with a note of triumphant fulfillment: "the enduring
contribution of Mr. Justice Holmes to American history is his constitutional
philosophy."1 The republication of the lectures comes at a time when it is
increasingly questioned whether what has endured is the triumph, or only the
statement of a minority position.
Within a year of the delivery and publication of his lectures, Professor
Frankfurter became Justice Frankfurter, the successor, once removed, of the
Justice he so greatly admired. If somewhat more obliquely, the essayist writes
of himself as well as of his subject, and as of 1939 the understanding reader of
Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court must have recognized that he had
before him not only an eloquent description of a judicial career which had
ended, but also, if he had the insight to perceive them, the initial guidelines
of a judicial career which was just beginning. The republication of the lectures
more than twenty years later therefore not only re-introduces the mind and
figure of Justice Holmes into the continuing and current discussion of the con-
stitutional function of the Supreme Court; it also inevitably sends us back
1 P. 58.
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to ask how clearly the guidelines of the judicial career beginning in 1939 were
perceptible, or how constant they have remained.
Of course, one could not expect that Justice Frankfurter would simply be
another Justice Holmes. Even Justice Holmes, given agelessness and a re-
newed term on the Court, would not have been that. Time changes both
Court and country and gives both different setting and different complexion
to the matters before the Court. In 1938 Professor Frankfurter could write,
"whether the prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' has
been violated, allow[s] comparatively meager play for individual judgment as
to policy," and of this and other constitutional questions could add, "they
are neither frequent nor fighting issues before the Court." 2 How Justice
Holmes would have met the issue under the circumstances when it did become
"frequent [and] fighting" we can not know. We can only know that it would
not have been the Holmes of 1932 on the Court of 1932.
But quite apart from external change, we misread the portrait if we expect
it to portray the artist father than to afford us insight and understanding con-
cerning him. "In law, also, men make a difference," 3 and the differences be-
tween men of law are not to be ignored. Certainly between Justice Holmes
and Professor Frankfurter the differences were as manifest and as manifold
as the regard and admiration were warm and deep. Style is not an accident
but an insight into mind and attitude. The style of Holmes was sparse and
tight-knit, the style of Frankfurter polysyllabic and given to expansive elabo-
ration. Mr. Justice Holmes came to the Court having "been singularly outside
the current of public affairs or of interest in them. He was essentially the
philosopher who turned to law.... That he did not read newspapers revealed
neither affectation nor a sense of superiority.. . ."4 The extent and intensity
of Professor Frankfurter's participation in public affairs is indicated, though
probably not exhausted, in his pre-judicial memoirs,5 and his voracious
appetite for the printed word hardly discriminates against newspapers, domes-
tic or foreign. Mr. Justice Holmes appeared aloof, and merely to accept the
system of which he was a part, though the fire that was manifest in the con-
clusion of his Abramns6 dissent, suggested that the flame was not always blue
and cold and that there was more of commitment than was often revealed.
But whether there was commitment to the system or not, there was certainly
not commitment to much that it produced. On the other hand, there could
have been few students who sat in Professor Frankfurter's classes so unper-
ceptive as not to recognize his profound respect for the legislative process in
a representative assembly, a respect which certainly approached the belief that
in adjusting the clashes of interest in a diverse society it, and perhaps it alone
among the instruments of government, could transcend the limitations of the
2 P. 42.
3 P. 44. 5 PHILLIPS (ED.), FELix FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (1960).
4 P. 55. 6 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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men who participated in it. That this belief persists in all its vigor. even in the
face of nagging evidence that in some areas the process suffers from congenital
limitations, has only recently been made manifest.-
With men of such different temperament and attitude. of such disparate
experience in affairs, what were the guidelines to the incipient judicial career
that might have been spelled out of the 1938 lectures? It is not, I should think.
the benefit of hindsight which enables one to say that they were there, and
clearly there, for all to see who would take their minds beyond the substance
of contemporary controversies. The Introduction and first lecture set out the
dominant guidelines, not of substance but of process, and they have remained
firm through the twenty-odd years that followed. "The history of the Supreme
Court would record fewer explosive periods if, from the beginning, there had
been a more continuous awareness of the role of the Court in the dynamic
process of American society." 8 So the lectures opened with the role of the
Court as their theme. All that follows is development. "[T]he enduring con-
tribution of Mr. Justice Holmes... [was] his constitutional philosophy," 9
and that philosophy was based upon his constant awareness of, and was de-
veloped in his answer to, the "antecedent issue": "What is the role of a judge
in making... [the] adjustments between society and the individual, between
the states and the nation ?-1o
Some men and judges ignore the antecedent question. It is possible, as has
been abundantly demonstrated, to be fully aware of it, and to answer it with
words that were an observation, but not an answer, of Justice Holmes: "If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away
all opposition."" That was not the answer of Justice Holmes. It has not been
the answer of Justice Frankfurter.
The answer of Justice Holmes came many times, in many forms, in varied
circumstances. It was almost always, mutatis mutandis, in substance the
answer he gave to the Fourteenth Amendment challenge in Tyson & Bro. v.
Banton: "I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can
do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition
in the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and that Courts
should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious mean-
ing by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular
Court may happen to entertain." 12 That was central to Justice Holmes. It was
the answer that Professor Frankfurter thought the role of the Court demand-
ed. It has been the answer that has guided Justice Frankfurter.
7 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962).
! P. 39.
9 P. 58. 11 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
10 p. 56. 12 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927).
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In that answer, the stress of significance, if not of statement, is on the second
clause, and one might stop to think of all that lies behind the "should"-
"Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions ...." If one could
explore, it is probable that one would find that the materials from which
Justice Holmes distilled that "should" were quite different from those that
produced the same ultimate imperative for Professor and Justice Frankfurter,
as diverse as their temperaments, attitudes and experience. Though of course
it is only superficial exploration, some suggestion of the diversity may be
derived from the differences in emphasis, if not necessarily in ultimate content,
of accompanying remarks. From Justice Holmes: "We fear to grant power
and are unwilling to recognize it when it exists." 13 From Professor Frankfur-
ter: "In view of the complexities of modem society and the restricted scope
of any man's experience, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the
worth of the experience and beliefs of others become crucial faculties in the
disposition of cases."1 4 It is not only the "should," but also the judgments
that measure the "careful," that may be derived from diverse materials. If
that is so, it is not surprising that the ultimate product should occasionally
appear in isotopic forms. Given Adamson vr Caltfornia'5 and Wolf v. Colora-
do,16 would the element of physical force, even in its particular form, have
moved Justice Holmes to the result in Rochin v. California ?17
If any of the guidelines that were observable in the 1938 lectures may be
thought to have wavered, there will be those who will say that they are the
lines to be seen in the second lecture, Civil Liberties and the Individual. That
may in some measure appear to be true, though-the point is not beyond argu-
ment-argument which would necessarily be such more extensive than the
dimensions of these comments permit. But I would suggest, if it is true, that
the reason may lie in the fact that the second lecture was not as accurate or as
penetrating as the first in its portrayal of Justice Holmes, and never success-
fully reconciled its analysis with Justice Holmes' and Professor Frankfurter's
answer to the antecedent issue. "Just as he would allow experiments in eco-
nomics which he himself viewed with doubt and distrust, so he would protect
speech that offended his taste and wisdom."18 This avoids the dominant and
antecedent question. It does not answer it. And it will not stand with the an-
swer that was given, as Justice Frankfurter presumably has discovered.
The reason I believe is clear, though it is as frequently ignored by those who
quote Justice Holmes (in part) as it was by Professor Frankfurter in his second
lecture. When Justice Holmes used the words that have now become a slogan,
and said, "the question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
13 273 U.S. at 445. 16 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
14 P. 60. 17 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
15 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 18 Pp. 84-85.
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danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent..."19 he was speaking of what, for the sake of brevity, we may
call a statement of political opinion as opposed to an attempt to produce ac-
tion. He was saying that even that could be punished if it created the now
familiar "clear and present danger." But there was also in each instance the
disjunctive, the carefully stated alternative, permitting punishment of words
having even less effect. Those were words spoken or written with the intent,
the motive, to produce the action which had been prohibited. It was evidence
warranting a finding of that intent, or motive, not evidence of a result or of
danger, that warranted the convictions in Schenck2O and Debs,21 and perhaps
also .on the fragmentary record in Frohwerk.22 In Abrams 23 there was consti-
tutionally adequate intent, or motive, but not the motive that the statute re-
quired, so, according to the dissent, the "silly leaflet," the "puny anonymities"
which produced no danger of substantive harm could not be punished, nor
could the "redundant discourse" of Gitlow v. New York,24 where intent was
neither charged nor proven.
It is true that Justice Brandeis qualified and tended to merge the disjunc-
tives in his opinion in Whitney v. California,25 and Justice Holmes concurred
in that opinion, but if our concern is with the words and ideas of Justice
Holmes we can not confine ourselves to the ringing phrases, and omit the
constant alternative. It is true, and perhaps most expressive of his view of the
function of the judge in this area, that he would insist on rigor, and not easy
attribution, in finding the required motive, as his own opinion in Abrams in-
dicated, as well as his concurrence with Justice Brandeis' dissents in Schaefer
v. United States26 and Pierce v. United States.27 Those two dissents, now little
noticed, and the analysis rather than the eloquence of the Abrams dissent,
might have given more satisfactory answer to the antecedent question of the
role of the judge in civil liberties cases than did Professor Frankfurter's second
lecture. That role might concern itself more with the question whether an in-
dividual defendant could be punished than with an abstract determination of
the constitutionality of statutes.
Professor Frankfurter's third lecture was entitled "The Federal System." In it
there was perhaps much more of the author than of Justice Holmes, a fore-
shadowing of the constant concern of Justice Frankfurter with the working
intricacies of federalism, an area which can hardly be said to have been com-
pletely developed in the mind of Justice Holmes. It is true that after the false
start in his dissent in Northern Securities Co. v. United States,28 Justice Holmes
found no implicit limitations in the constitutional grants of authority to Con-
19 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 24 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2o Supra, note 19. 25 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
21Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 26 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920).
22Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 27 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920).
23 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 28 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
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gress, and recognized that, "the wisdom of a particular use of the commerce
clause by Congress is for the judgment of Congress and not the Court's busi-
ness .... ,,29 Swift & Co. v. United States30 set the pattern which was to pre-
vail, the dissent in Adair v. United States31 was a statement of the reasoning
which marked the climactic turn in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,32
and the dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart33 was of course vindicated in United
States v. Darby.34 With respect to the scope of federal authority, Professor
Frankfurter could sound a note both triumphant and lasting: "From the
constitutional opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes there emerges the conception
of a nation adequate to its national and international duties, consisting of
federated states in their turn possessed of ample power for the diverse uses of
a civilized people."3s
With respect to state legislation which is friction-producing within the fed-
eral relationship, "it makes," as Professor Frankfurter pointed out, "all the
difference how deeply one cares for assuring a free market throughout the
country, or how discerningly one sees the economic interrelationships upon
which the attainment of such a market depends."3 6 Justice Holmes did state
his care,37 but if Professor or Justice Frankfirter would attribute to him dis-
cernment in seeing the economic interrelationships upon which the attainment
of a free market depends, it is an attribution in which I am unable to join. Per-
haps the answer to the antecedent question makes such discernment irrelevant
and unnecessary. It appeared originally that Justice Frankfurter might think
so. 38 But there is reason to believe that in dealing with the economic frictions
between the states-a tellingly different concept from "defin[ing] the ever-
shifting boundaries between state and national power"39-the antecedent
issue may require an answer other than the one concerned with limitations
internal to the state. Justice Frankfurter appears to have recognized that this
may be so.40
Now printed with Professor Frankfurter's lectures is the biographical
notice of Justice Holmes which Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Dictionary
of American Biography in 1944. As Professor Freund remarks in the Fore-
word, it is "remarkably sensitive... , at once.., compressed and... corn-
29 P. 98. 33 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918).
30 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 34 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
31 208 U.S. 161, 190 (1908). 35 P. 111.
32 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 36 P. 95.
37 HOLMES, COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
38 See, e.g., McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940) (dissenting
opinion); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
39 P. 43.
40 See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 470
(1959) (dissenting opinion); cf. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the
Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219 (1957).
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prehensive.... ." It has all the grace and life which Justice Frankfurter can
give to a tribute. If the portrait seems somewhat larger than life, that would
not question its merit as an essay, and perhaps not even its publication in a
dictionary.
Mr. Biddle's three lectures on Justice Holmes, given at the University of
Texas at the invitation of the Permanent Committee for The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise, may have accomplished in appreciable measure their stated
purpose of "giv[ing] you a picture of what he was like." 4' But to have given
an understanding of the judge, it seems strange to have focused upon some-
what :heated theological attacks upon his jurisprudence, and to have attacked
those attacks with almost equal ardor. The jurisprudence of Justice Holmes
is not beyond criticism, and more effective attacks and defenses have appeared
elsewhere.4 2
ERNEST J. BRowN*
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
41 P. 4.
. 42 See, e.g., Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holnes, 64 HARv. .L. REv. 529 (1951)
and materials there cited; Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REV. 929
(1951); Howe, Holmes' Positivism--A Brief Rejoinder, 64 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1951).
The Predicament of Democratic Man. By EDMONP CAHN. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1961. Pp. 194. $3.95.
The new predicament of democratic man is a moral predicament arising
from the new moral condition developed by free and representative govern-
ments. Edmond Cahn's analysis of that predicament sets forth the concrete
problems faced by the citizen; from that "consumer" perspective he elaborates
a specific and practical philosophy of democracy. The predicament takes the
form of dilemmas and paradoxes in the application of traditional ideals in
new circumstances; in the resolution of those dilemmas Cahn expounds some
of the principles and maxims of a philosophy of law.
Cahn uses concreteness to discover the resolution of a predicament and
seeks precision to relate the parts of a paradoxical situation. His examination
of facts discloses, in turn, moral responsibilities and moral incentives. There
are paradoxes in both which are similar to the paradoxes explored in his
earlier books: The Sense of Injustice was an appropriate name for a reexami-
nation of the nature of justice, and The Moral Decision established relations
among antitheses which often separate legal and moral decision-making. The
moral problem of democratic man is his involvement in the misdeeds of gov-
ernment; the positive aspect of our new condition is the possibility open to
him of realizing the elementary demands to which democracy is a response.
The Predicament of Democratic Man is therefore a plan of action for the
